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Two recent trends have rekindled the debate concerning the place and strategy of Russia on 
the world oil scene. The first is the development of its oil production (over 9 Mb/d in 2004) 
and the second is the gradual resumption of control of the country’s oil policy by Vladimir 
Putin’s government. Will Russia be a key variable in world energy balances? Could Russia – 
as some suggest and even desire – become an alternative source of supply to OPEC and/or 
challenge Saudi Arabia’s position? And if so, is this what Russia wants? Without 
underestimating the development potential of the hydrocarbon sector (and gas in particular) 
but without, at the same time, being overawed by the spectacular increase in the country’s oil 
production – which for the moment is no more than a return to the output levels of the 1980s – 
this question can be answered only by assessing and comparing the capabilities of the two 
countries to meet world oil demand growth. In other words, the challenge concerns their 
capacity for increasing exports in order to meet additional demand over a long period of time.  
 
Being the world’s largest oil producer for a certain period of time does not automatically 
make Russia competitive with Saudi Arabia on the world market. Two important questions 
must be considered here. Can Russia increase its output on a long-term basis? And is it able to 
have the spare capacity that it would need to influence prices? While increases in OPEC 
production are governed essentially by legal and geopolitical aspects, in Russia’s case there 
are also other constraints related to the estimation of reserves, real production costs and the 
evolution of domestic demand. 
 
In fact, Russia’s hesitation in adopting a clear position with regard to OPEC (and its price 
policy), which has been evident since 2001, simply reflects the country’s desire for an oil 
strategy that is better suited to its domestic situation and the new international context. In 
contrast with the last ten years, Russia now intends to harmonise its oil policy in accordance 
with its actual means and the economic and institutional constraints of its transition to a 
market economy.  
 
A comparative analysis of Russia’s performance on the world scene supported by information 
regularly updated by experts indicates that while Russia can still play an important role it 
cannot, in the longer term, compete with OPEC and more specifically with Saudi Arabia. But 
setting aside its physical incapacity to compete with OPEC in the long term, it would appear 
that Russia has no such a goal in mind. The growing attention being paid by the Russian 
authorities to the oil sector should therefore not be interpreted as a desire to compete with 
OPEC, but rather as a strategy aimed at using Russia’s oil power not only for economic ends 
but also as an additional instrument in its foreign and international bargaining policy.  
 
This policy, if it is to be coherent, must be based on one of two “polar” models. The first we 
might call the “Norwegian model” and the second the “OPEC model”. In the first, the 
hydrocarbons sector remains important but is not considered a fundamental factor in 
economic growth. In the “OPEC model”, however, the hydrocarbons sector is the principal 
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reach other goals, notably in economic development or redistribution of revenues. The 
position of Russia in regard to OPEC is, in part, the result of choices between these two 
options. While its professed aim is a market economy, suggesting the “Norwegian model”, 
failure of reforms seems to be inducing the Russian authorities to use the oil and gas industry 
for economic and social restructuring purposes and also as a lever in their international policy. 
This does not necessarily mean that the privatisation process is being called into question, but 
there may be a move toward a type of state control based on strong public sector participation 
combined with private capital close to the centres of power and, if necessary, on foreign 
companies willing to accept minority shares in the entities that are set up. In such a 
perspective, what might be the weight and strategy of Russia in a world oil market? 
 
1. Production and Exports: considerable differences between estimates. 
 
Russia’s place in the international oil market will depend on its export levels and thus on 
future production.  
 
-  Production forecasts for 2010 
 
For the time being, and apparently for a few years to come, additional non-OPEC production 
will come essentially (80% for 2000-2003) from the former Soviet Union (Russia and Caspian 
region), to the point where certain analysts believe that Russia (alone responsible for 79% of 
this share) could counterbalance the influence of OPEC.  Forecasts for 2010 vary 
considerably, ranging from 6 to 12 Mb/d. The most optimistic indicate that Russia’s record 
level of 1987 (11.4 Mb/d) could be reached by 2008/2010. But more sceptical analysts 
forecast slower growth, given that the factors that have promoted the rise over the last five 
years are gradually disappearing. In such a situation, growth of production capacity would be 
strongly dependent on exploration and development investments in the new  regions. The 
lowest estimates come from certain Russian agencies including the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (5.6 Mb/d) while the highest have been made by private oil companies and some 
Western experts (11-12 Mb/d). Between these two extremes there is the “moderate” scenario 
in which output is estimated at between 8 and 9.6 Mb/d, the upper limit of this range being 
today’s level. Thus, in the recent version of the government’s long term energy plan, 2020, 
(May 2003), the upper limit of this estimate is considered optimistic. It is based on a 
hypothetical oil price of over 30$/b. In the “low scenario” corresponding to prices of less than 
30$/b, output could drop to 7.2 Mb/d by 2010 or even to 5.6 Mb/d if efforts to renew reserves 
are not implemented. The IEA in its most recent forecasts (October 2004) estimates an output 
of 10.4 Mb/d by 2010, with this figure remaining more or less stable until 2020 (10.6 Mb/d). 
This is an upward revision of its previous estimates (2002). For such a relatively short term, it 
is surprising that such uncertainties still persist. 
 
Estimates of Russian oil production  
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(1) With a price above 30$/barrel; (2) CGES: Centre for Global Energy Studies. These estimates are based on an 
international oil price of above 20$/barrel; (3) In this scenario, there are no constraints. 
Sources: Annual reports of various Russian oil companies; The Moscow Times, different years, Fontaine (J-M.), 
Laherrère (J.), Perrodon (A.).- “Le rebond de la production pétrolière en Russie: Quelles perspectives à long 
terme  ? Quelles opportunités industrielles  ?” - Revue de l’Energie, n° 538, July-August 2002, p. 421-432; 
“World Energy Investment Outlook 2002”.- IEA-OECD, 2002; “Putin seizes Yukos shares; Yukos names new 
CEO” OGJ, 10 November 2003; Khartukov (E.), Starostina (E.).- “Ex-Soviet Oil Exports: Are the Russians 
really Coming” - MEES 47:4, 26 January 2004, 10 p. 
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-  Effects on crude export levels  
 
These production scenarios imply various possible export levels of crude oil. And it is exports 
that are the decisive variable for maintaining a sound balance on the international market. At 
one extreme, we find the most optimistic export forecast of 7 Mb/d (Khartukov, 2003)
1 and at 
the other a forecast of no more than 5.5 Mb/d in 2010. Despite the considerable difference 
between these two estimates, they both represent a marked increase compared with current 
export levels. According to these projections, exports would account for between 50% and 
60% of output compared with less than 45% at present. Such a rise in exports would not be 
compatible with the trend toward greater domestic consumption linked to predicted economic 
growth. In fact, according to the World Bank, for the next 5 to 10 years, there are unlikely to 
be drastic changes in the structure of the national economy. If there is an economic recovery, 
it will be accompanied by a rise in household income leading to transport development and a 
consequential rise in fuel consumption. According to the IEA, transport demand should 
increase by 2% per year between now and 2030
2. If these hypotheses are confirmed, exports 
of oil and oil products will be lower than the levels projected in the above scenarios. How can 
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1 It is important to note that these export figures were estimated by adding together all the oil pipeline projects 
without taking into account the decision-making processes of the authorities concerned or the financial aspects of 
these processes. The Murmansk project, which is far from being finalised, is a case in question.  
Cf study by Khartukov (E.), Starostina (E.).- “Ex-Soviet Oil Exports: Are the Russians really Coming”.- MEES 
47:4, 26 January 2004, 10 p. 
 
2 Individual car ownership is extremely low at 119 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants compared with 259 in Poland 
and 542 in Germany. 
“Chapter 9: Russia-An in Depth Study” in World Energy Outlook 2004, draft IEA-OECD, September 2004 
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scenario 
4.98 5.04        Russian 
Ministry of 
Economy  Pessimistic 
scenario 
4.62 4.66       
Sources: Khartukov (E.), Starostina (E.).- “Ex-Soviet Oil Exports: Are the Russians really Coming”.- MEES 
47:4, 26 January 2004, 10 p; The Moscow Times, different years; “World Energy Investment Outlook 2002”.- 
IEA-OECD, 2002; “Putin seizes Yukos shares; Yukos names new CEO” OGJ, 10 November 2003; 
Pétrostratégies, 10 March 2003, p. 7. 
 
2. Determinants of future oil output remain uncertain 
 
Looking beyond the reasons underlying the choice of scenario by the different actors (private 
companies wishing to maximise output and government ministries promoting exploration), 
the considerable differences between the various estimates are indicative of the lack of 
transparency and the uncertainties that still characterise the Russian oil industry. Unlike the 
gas industry, where differences in estimations have a lesser impact on account of the 
country’s considerable reserves, the poor reliability of oil industry data (reserves, costs, 
prices, real production capacity, depletion of oil deposits, organisation, tax system, structure 
of companies’ shareholders) exacerbates the lack of clarity surrounding the strategies of 
actors in a transition context marked by the instability of ownership rights
3. The future of 
Russian oil production depends on a number of factors.  
 
-  Can the recent rate of increase in production be maintained? 
 
The sources of the increased productivity in the period 1998-2004, at the origin of the 
spectacular rise in crude oil production since 2000, might no longer have the same effects in 
the years to come. For example, the devaluation of the rouble in 1998 went toward improving 
the profitability of the oil industry. Added to price rises in the same period, this margin 
enabled Russian oil companies to make considerable investments in enhanced recovery of 
existing oil deposits and the reopening of wells closed in 1994. (Note that at this time 28% of 
Russian oil wells had ceased production). Thus, most of the additional output of the last few 
years can in fact be attributed to the rehabilitation of existing deposits
4. While the 
productivity gains from these re-opened wells cannot be denied, the problem of efficient 
management of existing reserves must be addressed. In reality, this increase in output seems 
to have been achieved without any control from the authorities concerning the conservation of 
deposits.  
 
-  Uncertainties surrounding reserves 
 
One of the greatest unknowns affecting the evolution of Russian oil production concerns 
reserves. While they are known to be substantial, there is considerable debate as to their 
estimated volume. Figures range from 48 to 140 billion barrels, depending on the source of 
                                                 
3 Tompson (W.).- Putin and the ‘Oligarchs’ A two-Sided Commitment Problem.- The Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, Prospects For The Russian Federation Project, REP BN 04/03, August 2004, 16 p. 
 
4 Over half of the rise in production is attributable to three oil companies, Yukos, Sibneft, Surgutneftegaz, the 
first two having made huge investments in enhanced oil recovery technologies (hydrofracture, horizontal 
drilling). “World Energy Investment Outlook 2003”.- IEA-OECD, 2003, p. 148. 
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5. Problems of management and conservation of deposits must also be addressed, 
as mentioned above. These problems are a result of the policy of maximum exploitation 
practised by production associations during the Soviet era and in all likelihood still pursued 
today. The reluctance of Russian oil companies to invest in exploration in the present phase 
can only exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding long-term developments in oil production. 
Indeed, this could explain the sometimes alarmist declarations of certain Russian officials and 
experts. According to the IEA, 60% of proven reserves are “difficult to recover”
6. The low 
investment in exploration since the beginning of the 1990s
7 raises questions concerning the 
start of production in new oil-rich areas in light of exhaustion of deposits in the large Western 
Siberian basins. It is perhaps significant that with the notable exception of Lukoil the main 
Russian oil majors have, for the most part, increased their reserves through mergers or the 
acquisition of smaller oil companies
8.  
 
-  “Organisational” uncertainty 
 
It would appear that the future status of the Russian oil industry has not yet been fully 
defined. Recent developments suggest there is hesitation between several possibilities
9. The 
first possibility would be to put in place a number of state-owned companies that would 
dominate the sector and serve as a means of extending a centralised policy. The second would 
involve pursuing the structuring of the sector by developing companies with public, private 
and foreign capital, an option that would not exclude the possibility of the State keeping a 
golden share in the main ones. Given that total privatisation is for the time being ruled out, 
this second option would present the best hope of protecting private ownership rights, 
essential for the development of long-term investment strategies. So far, privatisation had 
taken place in an environment characterised by the weakness and opacity of market 
institutions, opening up little prospect of a model that could be described as an “international 
oil company”. In particular, private groups that had acquired state-owned companies sold off 
under the Loans for Shares programme in 1995
10 reacted by practising cash stripping (a way 
                                                 
5 For example, according to BP, Russia’s oil reserves are of the order of 60 billion barrels, the OGJ puts the 
figure at 48.6 billion barrels, and IHS Energy estimated reserves of 140 barrels at the end of 2001. The USGS 
evaluation is 207 billion barrels. Cf. “Saudi Pact Shows Russia’s New Strength”.- Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly, 8 September 2003, p.1-2. 
 
6 IEA, 2003, op. cit., p. 148. 
 
7 Investment in exploration in the oil sector a fell by more than 30% in 2002 compared with 2001. This trend 
continued in 2003. “Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives”. Institute for The Economy in Transition, 
Monthly Bulletin, September 2003 and July 2003. 
 
8 Lukoil has developed a strategy of investment in the exploration of new oil-bearing areas mainly in the North 
Caspian region and the Timan Pechora basin.  
 
9 An extremely concentrated industry in which four large private oil companies, Lukoil, Yukos, TNK (now 
TNK-BP) and Surgutneftegaz account for 66% of production and 57% of exports. Most shares in these 
companies are held by Russian banks, with the exception of Rosneft whose shares are all held by the State. Its 
share in production however is relatively marginal, at only 3.8 %.  
Locatelli (C.), Finon (D.).- “L'échec du consensus de Washington dans une économie en transition: institutions 
formelles de marché et secteur de rente” Economie appliquée, 2004 (forthcoming), 28 p. 
 
10 The Loans for shares programme gave Russian banks control of some of the State’s shares in the capital of the 
holding companies for three years in exchange for credit facilities. At the end of this period, the government 
could take back the shares in return for repayment of the loans. Otherwise the shares had to be repurchased 
definitively through a tender procedure, which was supposed to open up share trading in the companies. 
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11, behaviour which is not at 
all compatible with strategies to renew oil resources.  
 
-  The volume of financing from foreign investors  
 
The spectacular rise in prices is boosting revenues and thus opening up greater possibilities of 
self-financing for Russia. However, given that the government’s goals to diversify the 
economy imply using this extra revenue for other activities, this should nevertheless prompt 
the authorities to seek more financing from outside the country to develop the hydrocarbons 
sector, considered by foreign investors to be a more attractive investment option. In fact, the 
financing needed for oil industry investments is considerable, estimated by the IEA at $328 
billion for the period 2001-2030
12. Whereas before the arrival of Vladimir Putin oil sector 
privatisations had involved very little injection of foreign capital because of the ambiguous 
institutional and legal framework, now that the central authorities are gradually regaining 
control of the sector, the options and forms that foreign operator involvement might take will 
most likely become clearer
13. In other words, a great many oil companies would be more 
reassured by OPEC type production sharing than by total privatisation with no guarantees 
from the Central State. The new international oil context in which supply will be subject to 
constraints in the coming years has changed the terms of the equation as far as capital from 
foreign investors is concerned. Although international oil companies generally prefer to be the 
operators, they could to a certain extent be satisfied with substantial though minority interests 
provided they are given more sound guarantees than those of the previous period. This is 
particularly true in view of the fact that they saw their profits and cash flow explode with the 
increase in prices. Moreover, it is becoming vital for them to boost their own reserves even 
though for the time being the OPEC countries have not yet fully opened their upstream sector 
to foreign investment.  
 
-  Production tied to changes in international oil prices  
 
Maintaining certain stability in Russian oil production even at a level of 8 Mb/d implies 
developing oil-bearing areas that are less well known and not as easy to access, such as those 
of Timan Pechora and Eastern Siberia
14. The gradual shift of the heart of production to these 
areas might well result in a substantial rise in production costs
15. Russian production is by no 
                                                 
11 Hoff (K.).- “The logic of Political Constraints and Reform With Application to Strategies for Privatization”.- 
The World Bank, 4 December 2002, 39 p. 
 
12 In the document published by the Russian government in 2003 on the Russian Energy Strategy, required 
investments were estimated at $230-240 billion for the period 2000-2020. 
IEA-OECD, 2003, op. cit., p. 144-146. 
 
13 Locatelli (C.).- “The Russian oil industry between public and private governance: obstacles to international oil 
companies' investment strategies”. Energy Policy, 2004, (forthcoming), 17 p. 
 
14 Fontaine (J-M.), Laherrère (J.), Perrodon (A.).- “Le rebond de la production pétrolière en Russie: Quelles 
perspectives à long terme ? Quelles opportunités industrielles ?”.- Revue de l’Energie, n° 538, July-August 2002, 
p. 421-432. 
 
15 Four main factors are likely to push up these costs: harsher climatic conditions, deterioration in quality of 
Russian reserves, necessitating the opening to production of smaller less productive deposits, the substantial 
investments required for opening up deposits in more difficult and more remote areas, and the inclusion of 
capital cost in the calculation, largely ignored under the soviet regime due to methods of calculating provision 
for depreciation. It is nonetheless true that there is – and will continue to be – considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the cost of producing oil from Russia’s reserves. 
  7means insensitive to crude oil price levels. In fact, all of the “optimistic” production scenarios 
are conditional upon relatively high crude prices on the international markets.  
 
-  In the medium term, Russia’s contribution to world incremental oil supply will 
disappear 
 
Even with the most optimistic estimates, given the deposit depletion rates and current 
evaluations of recoverable and potential reserves, Russian output should level off at a 
maximum of 11 Mb/d after 2010. Russia would cover 12% of world crude demand as against 
44 % for OPEC (14 % for Saudi Arabia). With an output of 6 Mb/d, its share would drop to 
6.6%. Admittedly this is an extreme scenario, but one that is not ruled out by certain analysts. 
Assuming that the reality will be somewhere in between, Russia’s contribution to satisfying 
additional world demand will tend to drop and even disappear by 2010. This trend would be 
even more evident in the long term. According to the POLE model, in order to achieve 
equilibrium by 2030, OPEC’s share should increase to 54% and Saudi Arabia’s to 19% while 
the share for the entire CIS zone (Russia and Caspian) should be around 10%. Consequently, 
even assuming production of 11-12 Mb/d in 2010, Russia cannot challenge OPEC’s 
leadership in the long term.  
 
Weight of CIS zone and OPEC on world oil scene 
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3. Russia is not insensitive to oil price levels 
 
Objectively, it is not in Russia’s interest to oppose OPEC but rather to support (even 
indirectly) its price policy. Three factors argue in favour of such a strategy.  
 
-  First, changes in its oil production capacity 
 
Prices condition the profitability of the Russian oil companies, the attraction of foreign 
investment and the financing of investments needed to renew reserves. 
 
-  Second, its economic growth  
 
Economic growth was around 7.3% in 2003 and is still largely driven by international 
hydrocarbon prices. According to a recent World Bank report, only high oil prices have in the 
past enabled Russia to achieve economic growth of over 5.5%. A study by J. Rautava in 2002 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
  8showed that a 10% rise in the price of oil would lead to an additional 2.2% increase in GNP
16. 
According to Goohoon Kwon, IMF representative in Moscow, at least 80% of revenue gains 
were attributable to the hydrocarbons sector, the rise in oil revenues being directly linked to 
oil price increases
17. The hydrocarbons sector has been a vital factor in the growth of Russia’s 
revenues since the financial crisis of 1998. Furthermore, according to J.P. Pauwels and C. 
Swartenbroekx, risks related to less competitive prices for other (non-energy) exports due to a 
rise in the exchange rate (because of the oil price rise) remain very limited. Any drop in 
revenues from other exports would be more than offset by the increase in energy revenues 
(because of poor price elasticity in world demand for other exports)
18. Finally, the Russian 
economy is far more sensitive to the volatility of international hydrocarbon prices than is 
officially recognised: according to the World Bank, the hydrocarbons sector represents 25% 
of Russia’s GNP and not 9% as published in the official statistics by Goskomstat. 
Consequently, any price drop is extremely prejudicial to macro-economic equilibrium and 
thus to social stability. Conversely, a rise in prices results in a notable improvement in the 
country’s situation, as we are witnessing at present
19. 
 
-  Third, gas policy support 
 
This is a decisive element given that oil product prices strongly influence the price of natural 
gas. If the price of oil drops below $25, the return on certain Gazprom investments such as 
those in Yamal becomes problematic. Let us remember that its natural gas reserves and the 
development of these reserves are what give Russia an indisputable comparative advantage on 
the international hydrocarbons market. In fact, the country’s already considerable gas exports 
(some 139 billion m
3 per year to Europe) should continue to rise in the future (with exports of 
around 200 billion m
3 per year by 2010). If Russia wants to play a strategic role in this sector 
– the means are available – relatively high oil prices are necessary for two reasons: first to 
ensure the profitability of the gas projects given the heavy transport costs involved, and 
second to finance the development of its gas reserves (notably those in Yamal and Eastern 
Siberia). The possibility of a more far-reaching international gas policy in Russia
20 (that is, 
beyond the European market) is heavily dependent on oil price levels. 
 
4. Position vis-à-vis OPEC 
 
Because of its weight and its production maximisation policy, Russia can, in certain 
conditions - for example in the event of global surplus production capacity - influence oil 
prices. It must thus adopt a clear position with respect OPEC’s price policy. Two options are 
possible and have been directly opposed over the last few years. The first, favoured by private 
                                                 
16 Rautava (J.).- “The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy”.- Bank of Finland, 
Institute for Economies in Transition, BOFIT, Discussion Papers, 2002, n°3, 21 p.  
 
17 Goohoon Kwon.-“Budgetary impact of Oil Prices in Russia”.- IMF, 1 August 2003, 7p. 
 
18 Pauwels (J.P), Swartenbroekx (C.).- “La politique pétrolière russe: entre le G8 et l’Arabie Saoudite”.- Revue 
de l’Energie, n° 537, June 2002, p. 366-379. 
 
19 The main consequence of Russia’s high economic growth rate in 2003 was a significant decline in poverty 
levels. World Bank, (2004), op. cit., p. 11. 
 
20 Komarov (Y.).- “It’s a long time since we have been analyzing implications of gas market liberalization in 
Europe”.- Interviews, Gazprom, 20 January 2004, 5 p. 
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characterised by cash stripping and asset stripping and is aimed at maximising exports in the 
very short term in order to rapidly increase the value of assets. This trend was sometimes 
publicly confirmed by officials close to these interest groups. It is a strategy that very nearly 
led Russia to oppose OPEC or at least to adopt the behaviour of a free-rider. The second 
option, advocated by some sections of the Russian government (certainly by Vladimir Putin), 
and probably by Gazprom, which has a strategic interest in high prices, leans more towards 
cooperation with OPEC. Opposition between these two trends reached a peak in 2002 and the 
difficulties experienced by President Putin in gaining acceptance for his approach probably 
influenced strategies to gain a firmer hold on the oil sector.  
 
Given its financial requirements and macro-economic stakes and the improbability of OECD 
membership in the short term, Russia is not in a position to lead a prolonged price war or to 
accept low oil prices for too long a period. Furthermore, unlike Saudi Arabia, Russia does not 
have the room to manœuver that would enable it to play a role of swing producer. To be able 
to do this, it would need spare production capacity and the capability of rapidly increasing or 
decreasing its output in response to market conditions. Saudi Arabia knows perfectly well that 
its strength lies not so much in its production level in the absolute but in the volume of its 
spare production capacity. It can call this spare capacity into play to influence supply and is at 
present the only supplier (with OPEC) to have such a means of dissuasion at its disposal.  
 
OPEC would lose some of its strategic importance, and possibly its “raison d’être”, if for one 
reason or another it abandoned or could no longer maintain this (costly) policy of maintaining 
such a high spare capacity
21. While Saudi Arabia has just confirmed its intention to maintain a 
spare capacity of 1.5 to 2 Mb/d, this is neither envisaged nor conceivable in the case of 
Russia, which cannot afford to mobilise and freeze such resources for the purpose of 
stabilising the market
22. Its attitude quite obviously puts it into the category price taker and 
free-rider. 
 
We can thus understand the extent to which the future of Russia’s oil policy is largely 
correlated with a policy in favour of defending prices. It is not in the country’s interest to 
oppose OPEC  and it does not have the means to do so because of the production cost 
differential in the event of a price war. Furthermore, with the tensions between world oil 
supply and demand, Russia is no longer concerned about its market share. Even a drop in 
demand would in the first instance concern OPEC which, until proved otherwise, remains the 
only swing producer. These developments suggest that in the coming years, if necessary, 
Russia’s policy with regard to OPEC will be based at the very least on benevolent neutrality 
or even on carefully measured or more affirmative support, depending on circumstances, for 
example in the event of a price collapse. 
 
5. State regaining control of oil sector  
 
The Russian central authorities are moving back into the centre of the game. The energy 
sector policy will be used for the benefit of the centre and to the detriment of the oil 
                                                 
21 Boussena (S.).- “Oil and market stability after 2004 ?”.- Middle East Economic Survey, 47 (40), 2004 pp. D1-
D5 
 
22 Boussena (S.).- “La nouvelle géopolitique pétrolière et les perspectives du marché”.- Medenergie, (11), 2004 
p. 7-10. 
 
  10companies and the regions
23. The government is duty bound to maintain firm control over the 
evolution of oil production and reserves, and to control export strategies while avoiding any 
contribution to the lowering of international prices. 
 
If in recent years the choice to expand production from existing deposits has placed the focus 
on the short term, the insistence of the Russian authorities on greater investment in 
exploration is an indication that more attention is being given to long-term development 
concerns in the new strategy. This could explain the downward revision of production 
estimates for 2003-2007 (9.5 Mb/d in 2007)
24. The new oil policy appears to place greater 
importance on conserving deposits
25 whereas until now the logic was based on maximising 
private company profits in the short term.  
 
With this in mind, the State is aiming to reinforce its control of the sector while avoiding 
complete re-nationalisation of the oil industry
26. More strict control over access to reserves
27 
should be detrimental to the interests of the regions while benefiting companies receiving 
government support (Gazprom, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, Rosneft)
28. The State’s discretionary 
reallocation of exploration and development licences to companies in which it holds majority 
shares (Rosneft, Gazprom) is an integral part of this process
29. The proposed merger between 
Gazprom and Rosneft, is a mean to reinforce the Kremlin control over Gazprom (by 
increasing the State shares in Gazprom from about 39% to 50% plus one share). Is the 
takeover of Yungansknefetgaz (the Yukos main oil producer) the prelude to the creation of a 
big Russian state controlled (not necessarily owned) oil company
30 ? It would then be a 
question of creating a “national champion”
31 or several national champions based on the 
                                                 
23 The regions where the large hydrocarbon basins are located have until now had an important role to play 
because of the weakening of the Central State and the legislation adopted after the collapse of the USSR. 
Mendras (M.), (under the direction of).- Comment fonctionne la Russie  ? Le politique, le bureaucrate et 
l’oligarque.- CERI/Autrement, 2003, 122 p. 
Vladimir Putin’s recent decision to directly appoint governors without an elective process is part of this process. 
 
24 “Moscou prévoit une croissance ralentie de la production d’hydrocarbures sur 2003-07”.- Pétrostratégies, 28 
June 2004, p. 7. 
 
25 “Russia Leans Closer To Opec Goals”.- Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 5 January 2004, 2 p. 
 
26 “Kremlin’s Hand Reshapes Oil Industry”.- Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, n° 49, 8 December  2003, p. 1-2.; 
“Moscow flexes its muscles”.- Petroleum Economist, January 2004, p. 29-30. 
 
27 The more stringent conditions for obtaining a production sharing agreement are an illustration of this type of 
control. 
Konoplyanik(A.).- “PSA debate not over”.- Petroleum Economist, July 2003 p. 12; Petroleum Economist, 19 
July 2004, p. 9. 
 
28 Berniker (M.).-“Energy executives stand firm on Russia opportunities”.- Oil and Gas Journal, November 
2003, p. 42-43. 
In particular, the numerous special agreements negotiated by the Regions under Boris Yeltsin are increasingly 
being weakened by Vladimir Putin’s government. 
 
29 The re-allocation of licences for the Stockman, Talakan and Sakhaline III deposits are illustrations of this 
movement, as are the discussions on Gazprom’s possible participation in the development of Kovytka. 
 
30 « Moscow Tightens Its Grip With Yukos Auction ».- PIW, 3 january, 2005. 
 
31 “Moscou crée un géant énergétique d’Etat, Gazpromneft, mais promet d’en ouvrir le capital”.- Pétrostratégies, 
20 September 2004, p. 4-5. 
 
  11model currently developed by China where State policy is expressed through a number of 
public entities governed by a centralised strategy. This would be a new direction compared 
with the production associations of the previous soviet model.  
 
With a similar logic and to weaken Regional powers, the various amendments to the Subsoil 
Law are changing the present system based on joint attribution (Federal-Local) of mining 
rights
32. From now on, attribution of licences is the sole responsibility of the Federal State. 
The way in which the Russian government is currently handling the Yukos affair, and the 
positioning of Gazprom and Rosneft as principal actors in the hydrocarbons sector
33, show the 
government’s determination to control the sector for its own ends, whether at home or abroad. 
Finally, without wishing to confirm the previous regime of production sharing agreements 
(OPEC type), the Russian government still does not appear to be looking to a Norwegian type 
of system completely open to foreign companies. Clearly the Russian authorities hope to find 
an intermediate model that can attract foreign investment while enabling the Sate to be the 
deus ex machina of the procedure.  
 
The government intends to maintain control over Russian oil company exports. This implies 
reinforcing its authority over export networks via Transneft, a state-owned company. Rivalry 
between Transneft and the Russian oil companies over pipeline routes implicitly involves the 
important stake of the export capacity of these oil companies. Construction of private 
pipelines that would be owned by the oil companies must therefore be limited as much as 
possible. Broadly speaking, strict control of development projects and existing export 
pipelines, enabling crude oil exports to be adjusted or limited as the need arises, gives more 
credibility to the official stance with respect to OPEC. 
 
6. Hydrocarbons at the service of the economy 
 
At the national level, the aim of economic growth announced by the government is 
accompanied by a second issue concerning the how the hydrocarbons rent is to be shared out 
between the main Russian players (State, private companies and consumers)
34. Aware that the 
oil sector oligarchs have not, among other things, respected their commitments to reinvest 
their revenues in the oil sector, the central authorities seem to be favouring a policy with three 
aims: first, to redistribute some of the profits to consumers by keeping final energy prices 
relatively low, second, to feed more of the profits into the State budget through its tax system, 
and third to boost oil company investment in exploration.  
 
                                                 
32 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae.- “Proposed Major Changes in Subsoil Laws”.- Russian Laws News, 
February 2004, 1 p. 
 
33 For example, the creation of a Gazprom-Rosneft-Surgutneftegaz consortium to tender in Eastern Siberia shows 
that the State intends to have a large stake in the development of this region, one of the main advantages of 
which are the nearby export markets in Asia. Similarly, the Russian State has undertaken discretionary 
reallocation of development and exploration licences to national companies Rosneft and Gazprom. The case of 
the Stokman deposit is an example. 
 
34 The battle between Yukos oil company president M. Khodorkovsky and the government is simply the outward 
manifestation of the desire of certain government officials to share out the oil rent differently. These officials 
belong in fact to the security services (ex-KGB now called the Federal Security Service), a group known under 
the name of siloviki, which counts among its members the Defence Minister S. Ivanov. 
“Oligarchs Bow to Putin’s New Deal”.- The Moscow Times, 17 November 2003, 2 p and “Defense Minister 
Tries on Energy Hat”.- The Moscow Times, 18 November 2003, 2 p. 
 
  12Generally speaking, the Russian authorities recognise that, objectively, the reforms introduced 
so far have not resulted in the creation of a mature market economy, with poor consolidation 
of ownership rights probably being the principal cause of this failure. Two uncertainties 
persist, the first concerning the right to use the assets (the transferability of ownership rights is 
not guaranteed, as shown by the Yukos affair)
35 and the second concerning access to 
resources, given the way in which the State is granting exploration and development licenses. 
While growth is driven by the hydrocarbons sector, the State has proved itself incapable of 
controlling the associated rent. In light of this situation, a new political consensus is emerging. 
The aim is still to set up a market economy, but through explicit use of the hydrocarbons 
sector.  
 
7. The international aspects of Russia’s oil strategy: hydrocarbons as a geopolitical asset 
 
In addition to oil sector development, the policy of the Russian authorities appears to be 
increasingly aimed at setting up a coherent centralised strategy that instrumentalises the sector 
henceforth considered as providing a “comparative advantage” in international competition. 
The hydrocarbons sector, as well as being the main source of currency, would be explicitly 
called upon at a domestic and international level.  
 
At the international level, it is a matter of Russia playing a geostrategic role - thanks to its 
hydrocarbons - enabling it to exert an influence in major international negotiations both with 
respect to the European market, where its influence is decisive, and the major Asian countries 
(Japan, China, South Korea) and, more recently, even the North American market. When we 
consider the increasingly important role of natural gas in the world energy market, Russia’s 
role takes on another dimension. In a context where world energy supply is strongly 
constrained, Russia can see the opportunity of a strategic role, and one which cannot be 
ignored by the other major international actors. The Russians are seeking to exert an influence 
through their strong presence in the market to supply gas to the large European and Asian 
importers. Thus, Gazprom has now clearly established its intention of defining a truly global 
strategy
36. It is a matter of maintaining or even increasing its market share in the European 
Union and positioning itself on the Asian and even the US markets. Not content to play on 
competition between Europe and Asia in its role as a reliable source of supply - for liquids 
and natural gas alike - Russia is even going so far as to exploit competition between the major 
Asian actors themselves in its programme to develop its reserves in Eastern Siberia. The 
competition between China and Japan related to the first Russian oil pipeline to Asia is an 
example.  However, the recent statement concerning the final decision of the Russian 
authorities to choose the Japanese option by Nakhodak with the possibility of a branch to 
China shows ambiguous position of the Russian government. India is also interested by the 
Russian hydrocarbon resources and tries to acquire some interests in the development of 
                                                 
35 A clearly defined property rights system is a system that guarantees the three elements involved in ownership 
of an asset: the right to use the asset (usus), the right to the returns from the asset, or more precisely, the right to 
appropriate the returns from the asset (usus fructus), and the right to sell the asset (abusus). This system of 
ownership rights is that of private ownership, which presupposes two essential characteristics: the exclusive 
nature of possession and transferability of rights. 
Furubotn (E.), Pejovich (S.).- “Property Rights and Economic Theory: A survey of Recent Literature”. – Journal 
of Economic Literature, vol 10, n° 4, December 1972 and Coriat (B.), Weinstein (O.).- Les nouvelles théories de 
l’entreprise.- Paris: Le livre de poche, 1995, 218 p. 
 
36 Komarov (Y.).- “It’s a long time since we have been analyzing implications of gas market liberalization in 
Europe”.- Gazprom, 20 January 2004, 5 p. 
 
  13Sakhalin I. In fine, the Chinese banks has, recently, lend $6 billion loan to facilitate the 
Rosneft’s takeover of Yugansknefetgaz
37. 
 
Furthermore, with the globalisation of the natural gas markets, Russia can undoubtedly aspire 
to a decisive role in price formation for this commodity. In a context where there are tensions 
in world oil supply (and even gas supply in the case of the United States), Russia undoubtedly 
has a trump card to play in the context of the proposed “strategic partnerships”. 
 
From this point of view, hydrocarbons represent a structuring element in its foreign policy 
with CIS members, its “near abroad”, but also with the southern European countries and those 
of Eastern Europe. As part of their internationalisation strategy, the Russian companies, 
notably Gazprom and Lukoil, are increasing their presence in these areas by securing holdings 
in companies undergoing privatisation or through joint ventures
38. This is particularly true in 
central Asia and the Caspian region, which enhances the complementarities (rather than the 
oppositions) between these two zones. The Russian State thus intends to “reinvest” the 
economic space of central Asia and expand its influence in the region
39. This international 
policy could also explain the redeployment and multiplication of the interventions of the 
Russian oil companies (close to the State) in other oil producing regions, notably in the 





After wishing to rapidly adopt a privatisation model aimed at creating a mature market 
economy where the hydrocarbons sector would have been treated like any other sector, Russia 
now seems to want to give new direction to its economic strategy, especially since the 
beginning of Vladimir Putin’s second mandate. The ultimate goal will still be to set up a 
market economy fully integrated in the world market. But realising that this goal cannot be 
achieved immediately, the government has decided that in a transition phase it will use the 
leverage power of hydrocarbons to help speed up the process. In doing this, Russia has 
adopted an approach not unlike that of OPEC. Although according to official discourse Russia 
is working towards a market model (in which use of the rent is not explicitly recognised), in 
actual practice Russia’s development model is closer to that of certain OPEC countries, where 
hydrocarbons are used to accelerate economic development. Can this hybrid model, a sort of 
                                                 
37 « Chinese Lend Rosneft $6 Bln for Yugansk ».- The Moscow Times, 2, janvier 2005. 
 
38 “Broadening export strategy”.- Petroleum Economist, May 2004, p. 21-23. 
 
39 It is very difficult to identify the connections between Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy and the strategies of the 
Russian energy companies. But as R. Legvold underlines, it is obvious that the interests acquired by certain of 
these companies in pipelines, refineries and deposits in central Asia are in line with Vladimir Putin’s intentions 
to increase his influence in this zone. Different cooperation organisations bringing together Russia and countries 
of central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) have thus sprung up. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation is one such organisation. Note also that in September 2004 Russia became a member of the Central 
Asian Cooperation Organisation. This may be a forerunner to stronger business development between these 
countries and a new strategic influence by Russia in “near abroad” countries. 
Legvold (R.).- “Russia’s Unformed Foreign Policy”.- Foreign Affairs, n° 5, September-October 2001, p. 70. 
 
40 For example, the “energy pact” signed between Russia and Saudi Arabia in September 2003 following the 
visit of Prince Abdullah Bin Abdel-Aziz to Moscow is expected to lead to a certain number of joint projects and 
the participation the Russian companies (Gazprom, Lukoil) in development of the gas sector in Saudi Arabia.  
“Saudi Pact Shows Russia’s New Strength”.- Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, n° 36, 8 September 2003, p. 1-2. 
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